






An important debate in the philosophy of science, whether an instrumentalist or realist view
of science correctly characterizes science, is examined in this paper through the lens of a related
debate, namely whether science is a social construct or not. The latter debate arose in response
to Kuhn’s work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in which he argued that while there
exists a process through which scientific understanding evolves from primitive to increasingly
refined ideas, it does not describe progress ’toward’ anything. Kuhn’s work was then used to
argue that there is no such thing as a knowable objective reality, a view much in agreement
with that of the instrumentalist.
This paper argues that a generalized version of the correspondence principle applied to a the-
ory’s domain of validity is an exclusive feature of science which distinguishes it from socially
constructed phenomena and thereby supports the realist position. According to this argument,
progress in science can be characterized as the replacement of old paradigms by new ones with
greater domains of validity which obey the correspondence principle where the two paradigms
overlap. This characterization, however, is susceptible to the instrumentalist objection that it
does not fit the transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics. In response, it is required
that this argument depend on the intactness of certain core concepts in the face of experimental
challenge within some regions of the theory’s original domain of validity. While this requirement
saves the argument and even offers an answer to the question of what it would take for our most
established theories in physics, relativity and quantum theory, to suffer the same fate as Aris-
totelian physics, it also defers a conclusive resolution to the debate between instrumentalists
and realists until it can be determined whether an ultimate theory of nature can be found.
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Correspondence Principle, Domain of Validity, EPR paradox
1 Introduction
An important debate in the philosophy of science concerns itself with the question of whether the
aim of science should be taken as nothing more than to formulate a set of rules, explanations, laws
etc. which (in the case of ’good’ scientific theories) give excellent predictions as to what an observer
can directly observe when he carries out a particular experiment but say nothing about what the
world really is like, or whether this set should also be regarded as a true description of an underlying
reality. The former view is usually labeled an operationalist or instrumentalist view and the latter
a realist view of science (DeWitt, 2004).
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This paper will examine this question through the lens of a related debate, namely, whether science
is a social construct or not. A social construct can be defined as ”a phenomenon invented or con-
structed by participants in a particular culture or society, existing because people agree to behave as
if it exists; an example of a social construct is social status(Social Construction)”. The determina-
tion of whether science is a social construct or not has direct bearing on the debate between realists
and instrumentalists, for if it is true that science is a social construct, then this lends significant
support to the instrumentalist, who could legitimately claim the social construction as supporting
evidence. If science is determined to not be a social construct, then it must be an endeavor anchored
in some underlying reality, much in agreement with the realist’s position.
Using this related debate, an argument will be given for a principle that distinguishes science from
other fields more easily recognizable as social constructs, which in turn will be used to support the
realist position. However, this argument is susceptible to an important objection by the instrumen-
talist side, necessitating the introduction of one additional idea.
2 Kuhn’s Work and the Social Construction Debate
A good starting point for such considerations is the well-known work The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions by the philosopher of science (and physicist by training) Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962).
To give a condensed account, Kuhn argues that the prevailing contemporary view of science as
progressing in a strictly cumulative fashion does not correspond to the historical record. Rather, he
proposes, science progresses through periods of ’normal science’ which are cumulative, interspersed
by ’scientific revolutions’ which are not. He defines ’normal science’ as ”research firmly based upon
one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community
acknowledges as supplying the foundation for its further practice”. He calls these achievements
’paradigms’ and describes in some detail a process by which normal science, the goal of which is
to verify, develop and extend the implications of an established paradigm eventually leads to the
discovery of anomalies, i.e. phenomena which do not fit that paradigm. If repeated and varied efforts
to address and resolve the anomalies within the framework of normal science fail, a crisis ensues.
According to Kuhn, there are only three ways by which a crisis is eventually resolved: Either normal
science is ultimately able to solve the crisis-provoking problem, or the problem is shelved for future
generations, or a new paradigm emerges out of a proliferation of speculative theories and replaces the
old one. This is what he calls a scientific revolution. He deems the paradigm change non-cumulative
because the fundamental assumptions of the new paradigm are philosophically incompatible with
those of the old one and because it permits predictions that are different, something which should
not occur if the two paradigms were logically compatible. For example, while among physicists
the view is common that Newton’s theory of gravity can be derived as a limiting case of Einstein’s
theory of General Relativity which replaced it, Kuhn argues that this derivation is only possible if
fundamental terms and concepts are redefined: the terms ’space’ and ’time’, central to both, refer to
very different concepts in the two theories. Kuhn takes this to be an indication that the two theories
are actually incompatible with one another. If one agrees with the general position that scientific
revolutions are characterized through the replacement of old paradigms by new ones with which they
are incompatible, then this puts to question the notion that successive changes in paradigm carry
scientists closer and closer to ”the truth”, that is, an objective, true account of nature. So while
the process outlined by Kuhn describes the evolution from a primitive to an increasingly detailed
and refined understanding of nature, it does not describe progress ’toward’ anything. Kuhn’s work
was used, especially by post-modern philosophers, as the basis of an argument that there is no
such thing as a knowable objective reality, which in turn would seem to imply that the subject of
science is really no different from that of other activities which have no objective existence of their
own, but depend on their participants agreeing to behave as though they did, which is to say, an
argument that science is a social construct. Perhaps not surprisingly, this argument came under
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heavy criticism, especially by practitioners of science, who charged that Kuhn’s characterization of
science and especially that of his followers misrepresent the essence of science. For instance, the
eminent physicist Steven Weinberg wrote: ”Kuhn made the shift from one paradigm to another
seem more like a religious conversion than an exercise of reason.” (Weinberg, 1998).
To make some headway in this debate, it seems a promising exercise to try to pin down what feature
might make science different from socially constructed phenomena.
3 The Correspondence Principle and Domains of Validity
While people with a scientific background may feel that science is not a social construct, it is more
challenging than it seems at first to find a distinction that is truly exclusive to science to show that it
is more than a social construct. Referring to Weinberg’s quote, for instance, even endeavors within
fields that are commonly taken to be socially constructed can and often do require ”an exercise of
reason”. There should be little doubt that, say, Bach did exactly that in order to fit his musical
ideas to the then-prevailing rules of composition, even though these rules did not have any reality
apart from what their practitioners agreed to give them.
I propose as a candidate for such a distinction the correspondence principle. This principle was first
introduced by the Danish physicist Niels Bohr within the context of quantum mechanics (Tipler
Llewellyn, 2003), but here I am using this term in a broader sense: By the ”correspondence principle”
I mean that in science, every new paradigm must subsume the predictions of experimental outcomes
of the paradigm it is meant to replace, in addition to yielding new ones. The statement of this
principle can be made more precise by considering it together with the concept of a paradigm’s
domain of validity, by which I mean that subset of all possible physical phenomena to which it is
considered applicable.
The correspondence principle requires then that every new paradigm that is meant to replace an
older paradigm must yield the same predictions where the domains of validity of the two paradigms
overlap. So, one way one could characterize much of the history of science is that earlier paradigms
with narrower domains of validity were subsequently replaced by paradigms with increasingly broader
domains of validity that at least partially overlapped with those of the earlier ones. One could then
take this to be what gives meaning to progress in science toward something, namely a theory (or set
of theories) with the broadest possible domain of validity, that is, a theory that is applicable to the
set of all possible physical phenomena. The reproducibility of the outcomes of the same experiments
in eras with different prevailing paradigms (performed by impartial observers) is one measure by
which we can ascertain that this sense of progress is really imposed upon us by our experience of
how the world actually works and not simply because scientists agreed to behave as though this is
how it works.
One tends not to see something like the correspondence principle in other fields which could be
much more easily considered to be social constructs, such as the arts, music or literature. To be
sure, it is perhaps not uncommon that even in those fields, insights and achievements of one era are
subsumed in those of subsequent eras, but there is no discernible requirement that it must be so. In
fact, some of the most interesting developments in those fields derive their intrinsic interest precisely
because they represent a complete break with what had been done before. Well-known examples are
the introduction of twelve-tone music and abstract art in the early part of the 20th century. This
stands in stark contrast to science, where it would seem hard to imagine that any new theory which
gives radically different predictions from an established theory within the latter’s domain of validity
would be taken seriously, let alone received with interest, by practitioners of the field.
Returning to the debate between realists and instrumentalists, the proposition of the correspondence
principle as one feature exclusive to science that reveals it to be more than a social construct could
be seen as strong support for the realist point of view, since progress toward a theory with the
broadest possible domain of validity could be interpreted as progress toward a theory that describes
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the world ’as it really is’.
4 The Instrumentalist Objection and a Response
The characterization of progress in science given above seems to fit well with the history of physics
since Newton’s theory was first introduced. The predictions of Newtonian theory have now been
subsumed by more modern theories which can be said to have broader domains of validity because
they reproduce the empirically verified predictions from before while also giving correct predictions
in certain limits, such as high velocities and small size, in which Newtonian theory gives incorrect
predictions.
An instrumentalist might legitimately object that the characterization of progress given above does
not fit the transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics. Newton’s theory did not subsume
that of Aristotle, but rather caused it to be thrown out wholesale. Essential concepts of Aristotle’s
framework, such as the idea that things naturally come to rest, met their demise with the introduction
of Newton’s framework. In light of this objection, how can we consider the type of progress as
described above to be a truly distinct feature of science which supports the realist’s view?
To respond to this objection, I think, one needs to supplement the above characterization with one
additional idea, namely that this characterization of scientific progress depends on the intactness
of certain core concepts in the face of experimental challenge within some regions of the theory’s
original domain of validity. By a ’core concept’, I mean a central idea in a framework to which it
is indispensable. DeWitt likens a scientific theory to a jigsaw puzzle in which core pieces cannot be
replaced without changing the puzzle itself, and this metaphor seems rather apt. If the outcome of
an experiment reproducibly demonstrates a core concept of a theory to be false, then that theory
cannot be a true account of reality. But this does not necessarily mean that the entire theory
must be immediately discarded. If there are some regions within the theory’s original domain of
validity in which the core concept still agrees with experiment to a reasonable approximation, then
the new domain of the theory can be considered to have shrunk to those regions, even though the
theory is no longer taken to be a true account of nature. For instance, where the core concepts of
Newton’s theory such as absolute space and time are invalidated, they usually involve regimes to
which that theory is already inapplicable because of a failure to give correct predictions for a large
number of other kinds of experiments. In other words, the core concepts of Newtonian theory tend
to succumb to experimental challenge most readily outside its domain of validity, whereas within
its domain of validity, such as the scale of our everyday experience where its predictions of many
other experiments tend to be essentially correct, they tend to agree with experiment within tolerable
limits. The theoretical justification that Newton’s theory maintains a domain of validity even after
some of its core concepts are regarded as incorrect is that in certain regimes they can be considered
to be reasonable approximations of core concepts of theories with broader domains of validity. This
is why Newtonian theory is still one the first subjects taught in introductory physics courses. In
contrast, where core concepts in Aristotelian theory were successfully challenged, they involved the
entire domain of validity of the theory. Its domain of validity effectively shrank to zero because
in no regions within its original domain of validity could its core concepts be maintained even as
reasonable approximations to those of a theory with a broader domain of validity. This is why
Aristotelian physics is no longer considered a scientific subject.
What it would take for our currently most established theories in physics, quantum theory and
relativity, to suffer the same fate as Aristotle’s physics, then, would be a successful experimental
challenge that repudiates one or more core concepts in either framework within their entire respective
domains of validity.
Perhaps the closest that anyone has come to formulating such a challenge for the case of quantum
theory is Albert Einstein, who in 1935 in a famous argument now called the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen) paradox sought to show that one core concept of quantum theory, called non-locality, could
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not be right. At the time Einstein published his paper, the challenge was not yet experimentally
feasible, but almost fifty years later it became so, and it was non-locality that was empirically
confirmed, not Einstein’s argument (Griffiths, 2005).
What makes Einstein’s challenge noteworthy, among other things, is that in order to construct it
he was able to think of a question that presumably no one had thought to ask before to make
explicit and then challenge a core concept of quantum mechanics. His effort ultimately failed, but
had his challenge been successful, it would probably have eventually led to an overthrow of quantum
mechanics, because non-locality is a pervasive feature of the theory i.e. it is a feature found within
its entire domain of validity. This suggests at least the possibility that someone else might in the
future be able to construct a successful challenge by asking another question that so far has not
occurred to anyone. In this light, the difference between the realist and the instrumentalist amounts
to a difference in a prediction about the future: If a realist takes a successful scientific theory to be
true a description of reality, then he must deny the possibility that anyone could in the future think
of a question to successfully overthrow a core concept of that theory, because no such questions
actually exist. An instrumentalist, however, would by his conviction be forced to admit that such
questions do in fact exist and that therefore the success of that theory is simply due to the fact that
so far no one has been imaginative enough to ask them.
Given that the difference between these two positions has now become a matter of a prediction about
the future, it seems improbable that this debate can be conclusively settled one way or another, unless
it is known with certainty at some point in the future that the then-established scientific framework
has in fact the broadest possible domain of validity (e.g. in the form of a theorem). In that case,
it would then also be known that no questions that could successfully challenge the theory’s core
concepts actually exist, for if they did, they would shrink its domain of validity, thereby opening up
the possibility for the existence of a theory with a yet broader domain of validity. So in this rather
unique situation, any distinction between ”the” theory with the broadest domain of validity and a
true account of nature will be contrived, because there is no longer any good reason to deny that
its core concepts do describe reality. The debate between realists and instrumentalists will therefore
have been settled in favor of the realists. But then, science itself, as an activity to understand
aspects of our world not yet understood, will also have come to an end.
5 Conclusion
This paper attempted to frame some aspects of the debate between instrumentalists and realists
within the context of the question of whether science is a social construct and presented an argu-
ment in favor of the realist position that is however not entirely invulnerable to an instrumentalist
objection.
As a final thought, though, I would like to give an aesthetic argument in favor of the realist position:
Many practitioners of science chose their vocations because of an intrinsic curiosity about how the
world works. Adopting an instrumentalist attitude seems to undercut this sense of curiosity because
any explanation one might discover cannot be considered to be one of how the world ’really’ works.
To the extent that an instrumentalist attitude might diminish this sense of curiosity, it robs science
of one of its most attractive features.
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